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A B S T R A C T   
This article examines the roles and consequences of different approaches to 5G market design for 
innovation. The analysis is grounded in a conceptual framework that explicitly considers the 
complementarities among networks, applications, and services. Good policy arrangements align 
the legal and regulatory framework with the technical and economic characteristics of the sector 
and the broader, social visions for new technologies. Because the future development of 5G 
technology and markets is open-ended, policy has to be developed with incomplete knowledge 
and under conditions of uncertainty. These circumstances call for adaptive forms of policy and a 
focus on the creation of guardrails for market players, backed up by regulatory powers to 
intervene more directly if necessary. In the technologically dynamic 5G system, multiple stable 
policy constellations are feasible, but they likely will result in divergent outcomes and perfor-
mance characteristics. Monitoring of the experience with different national and international 
developments will facilitate global learning and the incremental improvement of policy 
frameworks.   
1. Introduction 
Fifth generation (5G), sixth generation (6G), and emergent sub-THz wireless networks enable a broad range of innovative services 
and applications (Chaccour et al., 2021; Lehr et al., 2021; Saad et al., 2019). Whereas previous generations of wireless services pri-
marily targeted the mass consumer market, many of the anticipated benefits of advanced wireless services will be associated with 
business and industrial use cases. Seeking to promote innovation and investment many countries are reviewing and adapting their 
policy approaches to 5G. This article analyzes the roles, trade-offs, and potential positive and negative effects, of different approaches 
to the regulation of 5G markets. It grounds the analysis in a framework that explicitly considers the complementarities among net-
works, applications, and services that are a characteristic feature of the advanced wireless ecosystem. Innovation is conceptualized as 
an experimental exploration of a space of technological and economic opportunities that is only partially known (Bauer & Knieps, 
2018). Regulation influences the working of these interdependent markets and shapes the decisions and strategies of individual firms 
to explore the innovation opportunity space. Although other public policies, including spectrum policy and industrial policy, are also 
relevant for 5G markets, this article will focus on selected aspects of regulation that affect horizontal and vertical business relations 
among players. 
In technologically dynamic systems, such as 5G, multiple stable policy constellations are feasible, but they likely will result in 
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divergent outcomes. For example, alternative policy models may influence the direction of innovation or the equitability of infra-
structure deployment differently. Good policy design aligns the legal and regulatory framework with the technical and economic 
characteristics of the sector and the broader, social visions associated with new technologies (Finger et al., 2005). Two primary sets of 
considerations influence the ongoing discussions about 5G policy. On the one hand, policy seeks to restrict the power of key players to 
manipulate markets and undermine competition. Although assessments of significant market power are part of the standard regulatory 
toolkit, the interdependencies among players in the 5G ecosystem raise new and unique challenges, such as how to delineate the 
relevant markets and how to deal with firms present in multiple related markets. Policy also seeks to select market designs that 
promote the innovative potential of 5G technology. Because innovation flourishes in a zone between contestability and temporary (but 
not structural) market power (e.g., Schumpeter, 1942; Shapiro, 2012), tensions exist between restrictive and promotional goals of 
regulation. 
Because the future development of 5G technology and markets is open-ended, policy has to be developed with incomplete 
knowledge and under conditions of uncertainty. These gaps in knowledge are typically bridged with a combination of powerful images 
of an abundant 5G future and persistent past practices. Deliberately or tacitly, they become blueprints that inform the regulation of 
emerging technologies during their formative stages. However, there is evidence that reliance on prevailing approaches can result in 
the retention of inappropriate policies (Briglauer et al., 2019). Experience with the regulation of earlier generations of interdependent 
information and communication technologies (ICTs), such as the Internet or digital platforms, shows that most regulatory in-
terventions have differential effects on players (e.g., Bauer, 2010). These effects are amplified in the emerging, highly interdependent 
5G innovation system and ought to be considered in the design of regulation. This requires shifting the focus from local, partial effects 
to an examination of regulation in a broader framework that considers all adjustments by players in response to an intervention. In 
other words, it may require reconceptualizing regulation in a general equilibrium framework rather than in the prevailing partial 
equilibrium approach. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The next section explains the unique features that differentiate the 5G value 
system from earlier wireless technologies. Section three develops a conceptual framework to analyze desired and potential undesired 
effects of 5G policy on investment and innovation. Pros and cons of selected forms of 5G market regulation are discussed in section 
four. The article mainly examines the experience primarily in Europe and North America, but many of the insights are relevant to other 
national contexts. Section five integrates these different strands to develop an overall assessment and derive implications for robust 5G 
market design. Section six briefly recaps important insights. 
2. The emerging wireless value system 
Third generation (3G) and fourth generation (4G) wireless networks are function-oriented and often use dedicated hardware for the 
core and the radio access network. In contrast, 5G networks are designed as unified, enabling platforms that support a broad range of 
use cases. They will constitute an integral part of the future, converged, gigabit communication network infrastructure. Although 
technical and business details continue to evolve, 5G services will most likely support a differentiated architecture suited to facilitate 
diverse innovations. Technical attributes, such as high bandwidth and low latency, are expected to enable novel applications across 
many sectors with potentially far-reaching, economic and social impacts. Many experts envision three broad classes of services capable 
of supporting a plethora of use cases: (1) enhanced mobile broadband, (2) massive, machine-type communications, and (3) ultra- 
reliable, low latency communications (ITU, 2016). 
Enabling a wide range of services will require network services that can support a heterogeneous quality of service (QoS). Software- 
defined networks (SDNs) and network virtualization will be critical to achieve such differentiation. In addition to innovative services 
for consumers, 5G is expected to support the Internet of Things (IoT) and allow the configuring of specialized services for sectors, such 
as smart manufacturing, smart transportation, and smart health care. Technological specifications allow the deployment of 5G across a 
wide spectrum of frequencies, from the 450 MHz band to millimeter waves in the 24.25–52.6 (and possibly higher) GHz range. This 
allows flexible configuration of technical, economic, and spatial propagation characteristics to achieve least-cost solutions for different 
deployment scenarios. For example, the “low” bands below 1 GHz are particularly suited to cover large areas at lower speeds; “mid” 
bands between 1 and 6 GHz offer less coverage but higher speeds; and “high” band services above 6 GHz achieve very low latency and 
high capacity in small cells. However, they require investment in many such cells to cover larger areas. 
This has profound implications for the organization of the value system. Complementary, interdependent forms of innovation will 
be more important than in the current Internet. As an Internet Protocol (IP)-based network, 5G wireless will consist of distinct layers, 
including a physical network layer (comprising a passive and an active infrastructure layer), an enablement and development layer, 
and an application/services layer (e.g., Devlic et al., 2017). Building the 5G network infrastructure will require high investment in the 
physical network layers, even though business activities in higher applications and services layers promise higher revenues and profits. 
Therefore, all players, but particularly network operators, will have strong incentives to adopt business models that allow overcoming 
this potential bifurcation of costs and profits. Strategic responses include vertical integration across layers, network service and price 
differentiation, and mergers, which all may have undesirable consequences. Monitoring of market developments to safeguard 
competition and innovation therefore seems to be a prudent approach. 
The organizational form in which 5G services are provided will co-evolve with innovation experiments, innovation successes, and 
failures. The regulatory model and the overall sectoral policy framework governing the sector will also influence sector organization. 
Because of the flexibility of 5G technology, firms have multiple options to build market presence. The legal and regulatory market 
design influences which models are feasible and sustainable. In a simplified form, Fig. 1 depicts several organizational options that the 
modular and software-defined architecture of 5G technology supports. Option (a) represents a vertically fully integrated organization. 
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Suppliers in this group offer network infrastructure, enablement tools, applications, and services in one organization to serve inter-
mediate and end users, as is typical for traditional mobile network operators (MNOs). They may offer network slices as well as local 
industrial networks and services via separate subsidiaries. 
Players with core skills in more than one layer may establish a presence across these areas (e.g., network infrastructure and 
enabling tools, enabling tools and applications/services). Option (b) represents an organization that focuses on active and passive 
network infrastructure layers. Options (c), (d), (e), and (f) represent players that specialize on one or two layer(s) in which they have 
core competencies and competitive strengths. New intermediaries (g), such as system integrators, will likely emerge to offer services to 
players that specialize on upper layers. Mobile Virtual Network Aggregators (MVNAs) and Mobile Virtual Network Enablers (MVNEs) 
are early examples of such players. End-to-end orchestrators will offer services to integrate components to create network slices and 
other specialized services across layers. The modular architecture of 5G will also open opportunities for decentralized entrepreneurial 
innovation, for example by allowing micro-entrepreneurs to gain a foothold in one or more of the layers (e.g., Knieps & Bauer, 2021; 
Walia et al., 2017). Moreover, the promulgation of the 5G New Radio Unlicensed (NR-U) standard further lowers entry barriers for 
entrepreneurs and users by offering a versatile option to deploy 5G services without the need to obtain a spectrum license or access to 
secondary spectrum. 
In this differentiated multi-layer system, several concerns may arise, which policy might mitigate. The presence of significant 
market power is one concern. It may be abused to manipulate competition strategically, to extract super-normal profits from the 
network ecosystem, or both. For example, vertically integrated players may have incentives to discriminate against competitors that 
are only present on one layer. Integrated players could use strategies such as setting high access prices, reliance on tedious interfaces, 
or refusal to provide services (Beard et al., 2001). Such incentives are lower if effective competition prevails at each layer, if the 
services are complementary, and if the regulatory system allows internalization of such complementarities (Farrell & Weiser, 2003). 
Nonetheless, because of the cost structure of wireless networks and the spatial heterogeneity of wireless markets, there will likely be 
areas and market segments in which only one or two players can offer services economically. Limited access to rights-of-way (e.g., 
antenna sites, access to multi-dwellings and office buildings) may aggravate such problems. 
Failures or deficits to achieve the necessary forms of coordination among the interrelated, complementary players are another 
concern. They refer to situations in which transactions needed to realize the complementarities among decentralized players do not 
emerge voluntarily, even though they would increase welfare. In 3G and 4G markets, market and non-market arrangements, such as 
model contracts, standards promulgated by industry bodies, and industry codes of conduct, have facilitated such coordination. 
However, the 5G value system is more complex and heterogeneous. Thus, effective coordination arrangements may not emerge, if the 
costs for decentralized players of organizing a market or the costs of transaction in a market are higher than the private benefits for 
these players. Coordination failure can also occur in the presence of benefits that are public goods, which are not considered by private 
actors in their investment and innovation decisions. Coordination deficits exist if the costs of decentralized, private coordination 
prevent the exploitation of innovation opportunities but policy interventions, such as open access and interoperability mandates, could 
lower the cost of coordination to overcome them. Thus, in addition to addressing market power issues, regulation and other forms of 
public policy may be justified if they reduce coordination problems in ways that promote innovation and generate positive net benefits 
for society. 
3. Modeling the effects of 5G policy on performance 
To address issues of market power and coordination effectively while protecting the unexplored innovation potential of 5G, this 
paper suggests grounding 5G policy in a framework rooted in innovation theory. Because only limited empirical data on 5G markets 
were available at the time of writing, this analysis must proceed at a conceptual level and draw, where possible and meaningful, on 
observations from earlier generations of wireless technology. 
Innovation is traditionally defined as a new production process, product or service, organization, marketing method, or design 
(OECD, 2018; Stoneman, 2010). More generally, innovation can be conceptualized as a creation of novelty that contributes to sus-
tainable efficiency increases and, hence, improves traditional measures of welfare (Antonelli, 2011). Digital technology greatly ex-
pands the role of software in the design of new products and services. More malleable than mechanical technology, it often accelerates 
the speed of change by reducing the cost of innovation. Because of its dynamic nature, digital innovation often unfolds in the presence 
of fundamental uncertainty. The models used in much of regulatory theory and practice, explicitly and implicitly rooted in static 
equilibrium economics, do not fully capture the factors that affect innovation decisions of entrepreneurs in the presence of such 
uncertainty.1 Under these conditions, entrepreneurial decisions are often based on hunches and conjectures about the likely effects of a 
project on future firm values rather than on the maximization of profits at the margin (Janeway, 2018). Evolutionary economic 
theories of innovation (e.g., Nelson & Winter 1982) emphasize the trial-and-error processes that can lead to innovation and thus offer a 
promising route to analyze the potential effects of regulation and antitrust in the fast-paced 5G sector. 
3.1. Innovation in the 5G system 
Through a dynamic, evolutionary lens, digital innovation can be conceptualized as a succession of experimentation (typically a 
1 Regulation and antitrust continue to rely on perfectly competitive markets as a reference standard (e.g., Kahn 1970/71; Laffont & Tirole, 2000). 
This provides desirable analytical rigor but raises challenges for the design of the regulation of dynamic markets (e.g., Viscusi et al., 2018). 
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recombination of knowledge) and real-time feedback on what does and does not work, the selection of a successful idea in the 
marketplace or by other means (e.g., policy decisions), and its scaling beyond the experimental stage (Antonelli & Patrucco, 2016; 
Brynjolfsson, 2011). In this general framework, it is possible to identify common forces that shape innovation in 5G and other digital 
markets in which complementary innovation processes unfold (see Fig. 2). The innovation decisions of individual firms respond to the 
conditions faced in the relevant, often interrelated market segments. Particularly important are the competitive conditions (the degree 
of contestability), the technological and economic opportunities, and the conditions for the appropriation of rewards (rents) for taking 
the innovation risk. In addition, the complementarities with players in complementary activities and the costs of coordinating with 
them influence the innovation activities of a firm. The rate and direction of innovation at the sector level emerge from these in-
teractions among individual players. 
Fig. 2 depicts a stylized version of the factors that influence the rate and direction of investment and innovation in a multi-layer 
system with interdependencies and complementarities between players. To simplify, only two layers—infrastructure as well as 
application and service providers (ASPs)—are distinguished, but the model can be generalized to more layers. In each of the related 
layers, innovation is propelled by the contestability of the market, the opportunities for innovation, and the appropriability conditions. 
If the innovation activities in these layers are complementary, the conditions of players on related layers will influence innovation 
activity in addition to layer-specific factors. For example, innovation activities at the network layer that lead to the deployment of a 
broader range of functional capabilities will likely expand the innovation opportunities of ASPs (and vice versa). Moreover, the 
strength of the complementarities and the costs of coordinating the actions of players needed to realize them will be relevant. For 
example, the availability of standardized application programming interfaces (APIs) will benefit application developers, because it will 
reduce the cost of innovation compared to a scenario in which the developers must negotiate with individual service providers and 
adapt applications to multiple environments. 
Innovation theory suggests that economic, technical, and regulatory innovation opportunities will be positively related to inno-
vation activity, other things being equal. In a similar way, the improved appropriability of innovation rents also increases innovation 
activity. The relationship between contestability and innovation is more complicated and can be positive or negative. Joseph 
Schumpeter (1942) asserted that temporary monopoly power was conducive to innovations that require high upfront investment and a 
willingness to take large risks. In contrast, Kenneth Arrow (1962) argued that, for a firm in a monopolistic market position, an 
innovation only replaces existing profits (dubbed “replacement effect” by Tirole, 1997). In contrast, a firm under (perfectly) 
competitive conditions will be able to earn a positive profit by innovating (dubbed “escape competition effect” by Aghion et al., 2005). 
Consequently, Arrow concluded that competition was more conducive to innovation than monopoly. 
Shapiro (2012) reconciled the two positions, recognizing that contestability was critical in both cases, but that market concen-
tration was less important. Thus, even a firm with high a market share might have strong incentives to innovate in a contested market 
to protect its future revenues and profits. Innovation incentives will be low, but not necessarily absent, in uncontested or only weakly 
contested markets (e.g., monopolies or tight oligopolies). Innovation incentives will likely also be low in ultra-contested markets 
because any innovation can easily be imitated by competitors. Only in the rare case in which a firm can escape intense contestability by 
Fig. 1. A simplified view of the organization of the 5G value system. Players in the 5G value system will position themselves differently across the 
four main layers, depending on their core competencies and business strategy. Some players will be fully vertically integrated (a), and others will 
specialize on one or more of the layers (b, c, d, e, or f). New intermediaries will emerge to integrate components across specialized players (g). 
Arrows illustrate selected vertical transactions. Dotted arrows indicate requests by players at higher layers to players at lower layers; solid lines 
indicate delivery of services from players at lower layer to those on higher layers. 
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pursuing a course of radical innovation may such markets stimulate strong innovation activity. This line of argument is compatible 
with empirical findings. Several studies have found an inverted, U-shaped relationship between contestability and innovation activity. 
As the intensity of competition increases, innovation initially increases. If the intensity of competition increases further, innovation 
incentives decline again. However, the strength and shape of these relations are subject to continuing debate (e.g., Aghion et al., 2005; 
Gilbert, 2020; Hashmi, 2013). 
3.2. Complementarity and coordination 
Recent contributions to research on innovation ecosystems suggest that interdependencies between players and systemic relations 
are exceedingly relevant in the digital economy (Fransman, 2018; Iansiti & Levien, 2004). Two factors are particularly influential for 
the course and direction of innovation: complementarities and coordination costs. Complementarities link the innovation activities of 
each layer, mainly by influencing innovation opportunities and appropriability conditions of players at related layers. A higher (lower) 
rate of innovation in one layer will have positive (negative) spill-over effects on innovation on players in related layers. Thus, the 
factors that influence innovation on one layer will, indirectly, also affect innovation on the related layers (and vice versa). For example, 
more rapid innovation in network technology that increases the variety and quality of network services will expand the innovation 
opportunities of players operating on related layers. In a similar way, a broader range of applications and services will likely increase 
innovation opportunities, appropriability, and possibly contestability on the network layer, thus providing additional stimulus for 
network innovation.2 This interdependence likely works in both directions so that weak innovation activity on one layer may constrain 
innovation activity at a related layer.3 
Coordination costs include transaction costs among players and possibly the costs of the adaptation of technology developed by one 
player to the requirements of the larger ecosystem. Because coordination costs reduce the expected gains from innovation (e.g., its 
impacts on profitability or firm value), they link innovation activities at interdependent layers in a negative feedback loop. Other 
things being equal, higher coordination costs reduce innovation activity, because they increase the cost of innovating, whereas lower 
coordination costs increase them. Coordination costs are not unique to the digital economy, but they are particularly relevant, given 
the increased number of interdependent players, the differentiation of the value system, and the need to produce a closely integrated, 
often synchronous service. They have resulted in numerous market and non-market arrangements that facilitate coordination and 
reduce these costs. Such arrangements include contracts between businesses, standards and protocols developed by public and private 
organizations (e.g., 3GPP), Internet exchanges, and digital platform companies, such as Apple and Amazon, which orchestrate entire 
innovation ecosystems.4 
Spulber (2019) distinguishes market-making costs from market-transacting costs. Both types of costs matter in 5G markets: the 
former during the early stages of innovation and the latter in more mature stages. For example, market-making costs will occur in the 
form of negotiating and contracting efforts for rights of way, network quality of service (QoS), the development of application 
Fig. 2. Factors that influence complementary innovation processes.  
2 There is a counter argument to this logic. Because innovation sometimes is a solution to seemingly insurmountable constraints, there might be 
scenarios in which constraints beget additional innovation efforts. However, these effects are probably rarer than the negative effects of constraining 
conditions on the rate and direction of innovation.  
3 An early model of such innovational complementarities was formulated by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) in their discussion of 
general-purpose technologies (GPTs).  
4 Another matter that cannot be pursued here due to space constraints are cross-border services, such as autonomous vehicles. Standardization 
and harmonization work will be important to facilitate such applications. 
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programming interfaces (APIs), or the negotiation of MVNO agreements. Market transaction costs exist, for example, if ASPs need to 
negotiate with multiple MNOs to launch their services. Adaptation costs may arise if an application/service needs to be adapted to run 
on different network protocols, or if ASPs need to meet varying criteria required by different MNOs for partner arrangements. 
There are reasons to believe that such coordination costs may be more pervasive in 5G markets, at least during the early phases of 
development and for certain innovations that require coordination among systems of systems (e.g., vertically integrated value systems 
in health care and automated vehicles). Private actors will succeed in coordinating their actions if the interaction is a common interest 
or a pure coordination game. They may not be able to find solutions in mixed interest games, in which one party may be able to gain at 
the expense of another (Friedman, 1994).5 Similarly, decentralized actors may not find solutions if the coordination costs are pro-
hibitively high, or some of the benefits have public good character.6 There is evidence of the emergence of market solutions to address 
these issues. New intermediaries, such as Optiva and Transatel, help reduce the coordination costs for other specialized players and 
users. Technical architectures, such as Open Radio Access Networks (O-RAN), also help reduce coordination costs. Where market 
solutions do not emerge, regulation and public policy may contribute to reduced coordination costs, which improves the ability of 
firms to internalize innovation benefits. If successful, such measures can help increase the set of projects that promise positive net 
benefits and hence boost innovation. 
3.3. Regulation and innovation 
Regulatory interventions influence this innovation system directly and indirectly. Some regulations target the decisions of selected 
players directly (e.g., by requiring that MNOs put together a reference offer for access to network services to MVNOs) with the goal to 
improve performance of the system. These interventions typically also have indirect and second-round effects on innovation drivers 
(especially contestability, opportunities, appropriability, and coordination costs) and therefore influence outcomes (the rate and di-
rection of innovation). For example, a mandate on infrastructure providers to offer MVNO access simultaneously increases the 
innovation opportunities for MVNOs and narrows the innovation opportunities of network operators. The net effect of these con-
tradictory effects is contingent on the strengths of these two effects and the extent of the interdependence between the interrelated 
players. If relevant, the overall effect resulting from these forces may be non-linear and difficult to anticipate, requiring a different 
regulatory response, such as ex post regulation, as discussed in more detail below. 
The innovation literature has recognized that different types of innovation processes − most importantly modular and architectural 
innovations − coexist in digital ecosystems (e.g., Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Bauer, 2018; Henderson & Clark, 1990). Modular innovations 
affect only one element of a system and can be carried out by one player. Improvements of individual modules stimulate additional 
innovations in related modules and initiate a virtuous cycle of innovation that percolates through the system. These improvements 
require agreement on an overall architecture and interfaces between modules but do not require explicit coordination among in-
novators. Modular innovation systems therefore are powerful engines of innovation, as demonstrated by the Internet. However, 
modularity has limits, and improving a system to a higher performance trajectory may require a restructuring of the system archi-
tecture once the opportunities for modular improvements have been exhausted (Yoo, 2016). Such architectural innovations require 
different types of coordination among the relevant players. For example, it may be necessary to agree on and implement a change in the 
overall structure and operational procedures of the system. 
These innovation types coexist in the 5G system yet thrive under different conditions. Knowledge of these innovation opportunities 
is distributed and not necessarily internal to MNOs. Consequently, users will also be important drivers of innovation (e.g., von Hippel, 
1988, 2005). They will be critical to explore the numerous use cases in industrial, government, and community applications. Many 
envisioned 5G innovations, for example, those supporting autonomous vehicles or advanced health applications, will likely require 
architectural efforts in addition to user innovation. They do not necessarily involve traditional MNOs and put high pressure on them to 
rejuvenate their business model. This innovation environment creates risks that players who have a wider control span over parts of the 
value system will sabotage more specialized players. Market and regulatory designs will provide important boundary conditions to 
channel competition in productive directions. They will also influence whether and at what rate these types of innovation will be 
explored. For example, an open network architecture and standardized connectivity platforms facilitate modular innovations. In 
contrast, a framework that allows the differentiation of network services, prices, and contractual arrangements will be better aligned 
with the requirements of architectural innovations. One of the challenges for forward-looking 5G policy, therefore, will be to design 
markets that support the pursuit of multiple types of innovation. 
4. Current and emerging regulatory discussions 
Competition policy and regulation affect innovation in regulated markets (Vogelsang, 2017). Regulation constrains and enables 
horizontal and vertical relations between players in the 5G system. It also delineates allowable transactions from those that potentially 
raise competitive or other policy concerns. In an interdependent system, regulations that are directed at a specific aspect of these 
relations (e.g., radio access network sharing, MVNO access) typically have indirect repercussions on related players. In this section, we 
discuss selected concerns that policymakers are currently discussing or that are emerging among experts and stakeholders (e.g., 
5 An example of a mixed interest game is the interaction between a vertically integrated MNO and single layer OTT players.  
6 An example of high or even prohibitive transaction costs may be the need to negotiate rights-of-way (ROWs) with numerous municipalities and 
owners of buildings. 
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BEREC, 2019; Cave, 2018; FCC, n.d.; GSMA, 2020b; Lemstra, 2018). The discussion focuses on four interrelated concerns: access to 
essential resources, achieving network coverage, how to safeguard access to network services, and concerns about non-discrimination 
and neutrality. In each of these areas, regulatory diversity currently seems to be on the rise (see Table 1, which provides a summary 
snapshot of the situation in selected countries). In section five, will reflect on the pros and cons of such increasing, regulatory 
differentiation. 
4.1. Access to essential resources 
Bottlenecks are essential resources that cannot be duplicated economically under the prevailing supply and demand conditions. In 
5G networks, they may exist because it is uneconomic to roll out multiple access and backhaul networks to remote, sparsely populated, 
low income, or otherwise disadvantaged areas. Bottlenecks can be an outcome of the scarcity of physical assets (e.g., duct capacity), 
but they can also result from concerns about aesthetic, environmental, and the potential health impacts of structures such as antenna 
towers. Examples of inputs that might constitute essential resources include access to civil engineering infrastructure for antenna 
placement or the routing of cables, access to buildings, backhaul, and possibly access to electromagnetic spectrum. These situations 
require nuanced analyses and appropriate responses. 
Limited space on civil engineering infrastructures is a potential bottleneck that may constrain network deployment to only one or a 
few operators. Hence, limited access to antenna space may constrain the number of players able to achieve cell densification. To some 
extent, whether bottlenecks arise is contingent on other policies, such as the laws and regulations that govern access to state and 
municipal infrastructure and the ability of wireless operators to assert eminent domain. In many countries, regulatory agencies do not 
have jurisdiction over these matters, even though they may have a voice. To reduce the cost of locally fragmented approaches, some 
countries, including the United States, have adopted federal regulations that provide a general framework within which local au-
thorities must operate. Appropriate provisions that facilitate infrastructure co-investment, network sharing, and spectrum sharing, can 
reduce the risk that such bottlenecks may emerge.7 These latter policies are typically within the remit of regulatory authorities. 
Stakeholders have petitioned regulatory agencies in Europe and the United States to facilitate access to fixed and wireless backhaul 
services (e.g., BEREC, 2017), even though no specific regulations have yet been introduced for 5G. Residential and business 5G services 
will likely generate a high volume of data that require backhaul capacity from points closer to the edges of the network. Additional data 
traffic will mitigate concentration and facilitate competition in the market for backhaul services. Given the high capacity of fiber-optic 
backhaul, there will likely remain areas where backhaul can be provided economically by only one network operator. In these lo-
cations, facilities-based MNOs could use their presence in both the access and backhaul market segments to disadvantage competing 
mobile-only players. However, if the role of players is reversed in other locations, that is, access seekers in location A are access 
providers in location B and vice versa, self-interest will create incentives for the players to negotiate fairly and in good faith. 
A third potential bottleneck arises in buildings, especially in multi-dwelling residential and commercial buildings. Developers may 
install ducts and provide room for electronic gear. In that case, multiple 5G licensees may be able to obtain access to a building. 
However, builders might prefer to contract with only one provider, or they might provision in-building, communications antenna 
systems themselves. In the latter two scenarios, sharing or access provisions may be needed to avoid an undesirable bottleneck. The 
experience with fiber-optical networks in Portugal, Spain, and France suggests that clear rules for access to buildings complement 
other policies and can boost rollout. All three countries have adopted legislation that requires the provision of information on building 
access, standardizes the types of access that must be provided, and establishes symmetric, sharing obligations (Godlovitch & Plück-
ebaum, 2017). Similar frameworks would serve the 5G industry without requiring the imposition of more intrusive access or 
unbundling obligations. 
A fourth area in which bottleneck-like problems might arise is in local access to electromagnetic spectrum. Many envisioned 5G 
services in smart manufacturing, smart agriculture, and similar applications require access to local spectrum, for example in a port or in 
an industrial location. A few countries, including the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United States, have started to 
issue highly granular local licenses in addition to national and regional ones (e.g., Matinmikko-Blue et al., 2021). Other countries have 
strengthened provisions that facilitate secondary spectrum market transactions, such as spectrum-leasing and spectrum-sharing ar-
rangements. Secondary markets need careful design to generate sufficient liquidity (e.g., Gomez et al., 2019; Lehr, 2020). A few 
countries, including Italy, have introduced use-it-or-lose-it provisions to facilitate local spectrum access. Germany decided to set aside 
100 MHz of spectrum for local industrial licenses to be issued on a first-come, first-served basis to industrial and other local users 
(GSMA, 2020a). Each of these solutions has potential advantages and disadvantages. Only experience will tell whether any model 
works better than others to support 5G investment and innovation (e.g., Knieps & Bauer, 2021). 
Because of the high, technological dynamics of 5G services, traditional forms of price and access regulation to address these types of 
bottlenecks might lock in inefficient solutions. Thus, it would be desirable to find a different regulatory approach that avoids the 
complexities and potential pitfalls of applying traditional instruments of ex ante regulation in the presence of positive and negative 
feedbacks. Reliance on adaptive, agile forms of regulation to neutralize bottlenecks might avoid such disadvantages. These include 
general, symmetric obligations, such as most-favored nation clauses for access, a duty to negotiate spectrum and infrastructure-sharing 
arrangements in good faith, and empowering regulatory agencies to mediate where private negotiations fail. Thus, the emphasis of 
policy would shift from the design of precise, ex ante, regulatory interventions to the design of boundary conditions or a “constitution” 
7 A study of European 4G markets by Abate et al. (2020, p. 51) suggests that network and spectrum sharing have positive impacts on average 
download speeds in four player markets. However, rivalrous three-players without sharing outperform four-player markets. 




Diversity of 5G regulation in selected countries.   
Germany Italy Netherlands United Kingdom United States 
Backhaul1 Fixed backhaul regulated if 
significant market power (SMP, 
Markets 3a, 3b, 4). Mobile backhaul 
not a separate SMP market 
Fixed backhaul regulated if SMP (Markets 
3a, 3b, 4). Mobile backhaul is not a 
separate SMP market 
Fixed backhaul regulated if 
SMP (Markets 3a, 3b, 4). 
Mobile backhaul is not a 
separate SMP market 
Fixed backhaul regulated, but no open 
access to ducts and poles to configure 
backhaul for mobile services 
Regulated in very limited 
circumstances 
Access to local 
spectrum 
users2 
Set aside of 100 MHz for campus 
licenses; secondary market 
transactions 
Operators holding at least 80 MHz in 
3.4–3.8 GHz band are obliged to provide 
access to service providers to foster 
verticals; use it or lose it provisions 
Some spectrum auctioned 
locally, no specific measures to 
support industrial 5G networks 
Ofcom makes local, time-limited licenses 
available on a first-come first served basis 
in three bands (1800 MHz shared, 2300 
MHz shared, 3.8–4.2 GHz) 
Some licenses (e.g., CBRS) 
auctioned at county level; 
secondary market transactions 
Coverage 
obligations 
in LTE and 
5G3 
2019 auctions include household, 
road, railway, ports, and underserved 
area coverage obligations 
Coverage goals for population, 
underserved areas, roads, railroads, 
airports, ports 
98% outdoor coverage of each 
commune, will be lifted in 
2030 
No coverage mandates but voluntary 
coverage commitments by four UK MNOs 
Generally, no coverage 
obligations, except in reverse 
auctions intended to extend 
service to unserved areas 
MVNO access4 MNOs need to negotiate non- 
discriminatory access conditions; no 
reference offer 
No regulatory mandate to offer MVNO 
access; no reference offer 
No regulatory mandate to offer 
MVNO access; no reference 
offer 
No regulatory mandate to offer MVNO 
access; no reference offer 
No regulatory mandate to offer 
MVNO access; no reference offer 
Network 
neutrality 
Mobile networks subject to neutrality 
regulation; reasonable traffic 
management permitted 
Mobile networks subject to neutrality 
regulation; reasonable traffic 
management permitted 
Mobile networks subject to 
neutrality regulation; 
reasonable traffic management 
permitted 
Mobile network neutrality guidelines 
applied via self-regulatory approach, to be 
reviewed in 2021 by Ofcom 
No mobile network neutrality 
provisions 
Notes: CBRS … Citizen Band Radio Service in the United States (3350 MHz–3700 MHz). 
Sources: Research by the authors. 1 BEREC (2017). 2 Sörries and Nett (2019). 3 Cullen (2020). 4 Cullen (2021); in Germany and Italy MVNO access commitments were negotiated as part of merger and 
antitrust cases. 
J.M
. Bauer and E. Bohlin                                                                                                                                                                                            
Telecommunications Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx
9
of 5G markets. This approach is less intrusive and gives players entrepreneurial freedom to experiment with innovative, mutually 
beneficial solutions while providing non-discrimination safeguards. 
4.2. Network coverage obligations 
As fundamental, possibly general purpose, technologies 5G communication networks and services enable players on higher levels 
of the value system to create welfare-enhancing applications and services. However, the timeline of operators (whose decisions to 
invest in network coverage are driven by benefits they can internalize) and the socially optimal timeline of infrastructure rollout may 
deviate, especially in sparsely populated and low-income areas. To avoid undesirable spectrum warehousing and foster the devel-
opment of ubiquitous infrastructures, licenses are often combined with interim milestones and performance targets for network 
coverage and supported speeds. Failure to meet such requirements typically leads to regulatory actions that range from fines to the 
reassignment of the spectrum to other users. 
Setting such milestones requires a detailed, forward-looking understanding of market developments and a clear vision of how the 
private and social timeline of investment can be aligned. In many countries, coverage obligations are a substitute for missing universal 
service policies (e.g., Prado & Bauer, 2021). The widespread framing of the transition to 5G as a global technology race and the 
uncertainties surrounding its market potential create a high risk that policy will set unreasonable targets. Because of the comple-
mentary innovation system formed by 5G network and services, it is difficult to establish in advance which levels of network coverage 
and performance will further innovation. Goals set too high could threaten the sustainability of infrastructure coverage. In contrast, 
goals that are set too low could become focal points that inadvertently synchronize network operator decisions. Thus, overly modest 
aspirations could lock in low levels of infrastructure investment in some areas and impede complementary innovations in services and 
applications. 
Cave and Nicholls (2017) maintain that spectrum auctions that include network coverage and other obligations have become very 
sophisticated so that these goals can be achieved without significant efficiency losses. It is not clear that this proposition, which is 
based on observations of earlier generations of wireless markets will also hold for 5G markets with their more complex and inter-
dependent value system. Moreover, the growing diversity of detailed coverage obligations introduced by regulators risks reducing 
operational efficiencies by segmenting national and international wireless markets. These dynamic tradeoffs are typically not explored 
when deciding whether and how to implement coverage requirements. Given these conditions of 5G markets, it would be preferable to 
let entrepreneurs discover the sustainability of market-driven innovations in a trial-and-error process and then adopt corrective 
measures if necessary. Such interventions can rely on a broad set of tools, such as universal service programs and reverse auctions. 
4.3. Access conditions for mobile virtual players 
During the past decade, several types of mobile virtual players have emerged. Mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) have 
been around since 1999, when Virgin Mobile started is operations. Although their business models vary, MVNOs typically do not hold 
spectrum licenses and do not own network infrastructure. In past generations of wireless, MVNOs often offered services similar to those 
of the networks upon which their operations were based (e.g., mobile voice, mobile data). MVNOs added value by differentiating 
prices, service quality, and other attributes. More recently, mobile virtual network aggregators (MVNAs) and mobile virtual network 
enablers (MVNEs), such as Optiva and Transatel, have entered the market. (We will collectively refer to all three types as MVNXs.) 
These newer intermediaries typically offer services that reduce coordination costs among other players, for example, between users 
and mobile network operators. MVNAs and MVNEs can be considered early instances of enablers whose importance will increase in 5G 
where they will provide coordination services to facilitate specialized network slices and other customized services. 
In the much larger 5G innovation space, many experts foresee that MVNXs will be instrumental in the rapid exploitation of these 
opportunities, particularly in specialized services. This might include autonomous vehicles, logistics and transport, and health, often 
envisioned as uniquely configured “network slices” (Frias & Martínez, 2017). Regulated reference offers to grant MVNXs access to 
MNO resources may be justified if competition in the network layer is not workable or if there is reason to believe that vertically 
integrated MNOs may thwart the ability of MVNXs to offer services (e.g., by charging high prices for access or by strategically delaying 
negotiations). The need to engage in bilateral negotiations with multiple MNOs may also create coordination costs that reduce the level 
of ASP innovation. MVNAs and MVNEs emerged as a market solution to overcome these costs. By aggregating demand from smaller 
MVNOs and users, they can negotiate with MNOs more effectively than individual users and small MVNOs. For 5G market designers, 
the question arises whether policies are needed to facilitate the vertical business relations between network operators and higher-level 
MVNXs.8 
Past experiences with MVNO regulation can provide some guidance, even though solid empirical studies are rare. Empirical ob-
servations corroborate that MNOs have strong incentives to open their networks for MVNOs during the early rollout stages, because 
they contribute to better utilization of the deployed capacity (Haucap, 2006; Lewin, 2001). This initial congruence between MNO and 
MVNO interests might revert later in the investment cycle if MNOs generate sufficient capacity utilization with their own customers. 
However, because of the direct and indirect effects discussed in the previous paragraph, mandates on MNOs to provide access to 
8 In past wireless generations, countries have adopted divergent paths regarding MVNO access. For example, in 2017, eight of thirty-two European 
countries had established regulated reference offers to grant MVNOs access to mobile networks, and several others had some form of regulatory 
intervention to facilitate MVNO access. In all other countries, MVNO agreements were negotiated commercially. See Cullen (2017). 
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MVNXs have ambiguous repercussions on the incentives of MNOs to invest in additional capacity. A study of 3G services by Kim et al. 
(2011) found that the regulation of MVNO access reduced MNO capital expenditures (capex) by about 17.1%. This suggests that, 
overall, the negative effects dominated the positive ones. Voluntary commercial agreements did not have a statistically significant 
negative or positive effect on capex. 
Looking forward to 5G, it seems likely that commercially viable agreements will emerge in areas with strong, synergistic relations 
between MNOs and ASPs. Many new applications in industry, transportation, and health will require sector-specific knowledge and 
differentiated network support, some with high technical quality of service. The exploration and exploitation of these innovation 
opportunities will require collaboration among firms with specialized knowledge of the interrelated domains. A standardized access 
product offered by MNOs may be insufficient to explore these innovation spaces fully, but it might accelerate the rollout of initial 
applications and services. In general, even though it may initially entail higher transaction costs, a preferable strategy would be to 
allow negotiations among interested players that are safeguarded by ex post regulation and competition law. 
Taken together, these observations suggest that it would be helpful to empower regulatory agencies to develop a market- 
monitoring framework. Oversight should be combined with a formalized appeals process to break impasses in private negotiations. 
This approach would protect entrepreneurial flexibility while providing safeguards against discrimination and sabotage of smaller 
players. Because of the very active standardization efforts by 3GPP and other players, it seems likely that, over time, de facto reference 
models and offers will emerge for standard and specialized network services. Other options exist to balance the competing and 
counteracting, dynamic interrelations in ways that support bottom-up market developments. One alternative approach is to generate a 
most-favored nation (MFN) obligation that would have the effect of reducing transaction costs over time. In this model, contractual 
conditions offered to one firm would have to be made available on a general basis to other, comparable firms in the 5G system. This 
allows entrepreneurial flexibility while building safeguards against strategic discrimination into the market design. 
4.4. Non-discrimination safeguards 
Digital markets have raised concerns about the ability of dominant players to manipulate competition in ways that competition 
policy would find difficult to detect (Crémer et al., 2019; Morton et al., 2019). There is widespread agreement among economists and 
engineers that QoS and price differentiation are efficiency-enhancing (e.g., Krämer et al., 2013). However, competition policy and 
regulation lack tools to analyze the ecosystem effects of competitive behavior or its effects on important social goals, such as end-user 
access to content of their choice. As a pragmatic safeguard, several countries have adopted network neutrality safeguards. An emerging 
debate on “full stack neutrality” explores whether neutrality precautions should be extended to devices, services such as search, and to 
data (e.g., ARCEP, 2018; Easley et al., 2018). Similar concerns have been articulated for 5G networks and services with the intention to 
reduce coordination and transaction costs with the goal to stimulate innovation (e.g., Lemstra et al., 2017). 
Because the provision of differentiated services to specialized user groups is one key feature of 5G, designing non-discrimination 
safeguards is complicated. Network neutrality rules govern the relations between network operators and players on higher layers in the 
ICT value system. Although definitions are not completely standardized, "strict" neutrality typically implies that each datagram is 
treated equally, regardless of its origin, destination, service, and content. "Weak" neutrality permits differentiation of network services 
and pricing if they are offered to all other players on a non-discriminatory basis and not only to selected players (Bauer & Knieps, 
2018). Network neutrality obligations affect the 5G complementary innovation system in two major ways that can affect overall 
outcomes positively or negatively: first, they influence the ability of players to appropriate rents from innovation; second, they in-
fluence the coordination costs of players. In the interconnected 5G ecosystem, these effects are asymmetric, dynamic, and difficult to 
evaluate ex ante. For example, other things being equal, network neutrality may weaken the innovation incentives for MNOs, but they 
may strengthen the innovation incentives of complementary ASPs (which in turn may increase the innovation incentives of MNOs). 
Given the non-linear interdependencies in the ICT value system, it is not surprising that past research has found a range of possible 
outcomes (each reflecting different modeling assumptions and types of dynamic equilibria). Several scholars suggest that the impo-
sition of strict net neutrality constraints on network operators will diminish short-term efficiency (e.g., Krämer et al., 2013). Briglauer 
et al. (2020) found weak negative effects of net neutrality regulation on investment in fiber networks. Depending on the specific model 
assumptions, some research suggests positive effects of strict neutrality on network investment and innovation, but others find a range 
of possible outcomes (e.g., Bourreau et al., 2015;Choi and Kim, 2010; Choi et al., 2018; Greenstein et al., 2016; Reggiani & Valletti, 
2016). Choi et al. (2015) find that the effects of net neutrality regulation also depend on the business models of content providers. 
Conceptual and empirical analyses suggest that the main effect of net neutrality (and by analogy, other forms of neutrality in the 5G 
system) is not to support or impede innovation. Rather, depending on how neutrality rules are specified, they will likely change the 
type of innovation activities and the resulting outcomes. For example, strict net neutrality policy will tend to favor modular in-
novations, possibly at the expense of architectural types of innovation. As envisioned by proponents of weak network neutrality, 
allowing differentiation while safeguarding non-discrimination and interoperability will likely constitute a more balanced approach 
that provides room for modular and architectural innovation. However, empirical research has not yet tested these conjectures. 
Rather than locking in strict neutrality or other regulatory frameworks that force MNOs and/or other players in the stack to offer 
one set of conditions to all other players, this reasoning suggests that it would be preferable to allow the differentiation of network 
services while putting non-discrimination safeguards in place (Bauer & Knieps, 2018; van Schewick, 2010). This would free entre-
preneurs to pursue a mix of integrated and modular innovations, which will offer more avenues to explore the innovation space of 5G. 
Such an approach would allow innovation processes that require network quality differentiation and integration across layers to 
coexist with those that thrive under conditions of openness and standardization. Strict net neutrality rules cannot reconcile the dual 
goals of differentiation and non-discrimination, but weak net neutrality, supported by competition policy and possibly ex post 
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regulation, would allow it. 
5. Implications for 5G policy 
As the discussion thus far shows, the legal and regulatory framework for 5G services will have to be developed with incomplete 
knowledge. Marcus (2017) warned that claims for or against regulation cannot be refuted easily, because of the uncertainty sur-
rounding many aspects of 5G. This section offers a framework that can be employed when designing a 5G market and regulatory order. 
Given the interrelated value system of 5G services, three effects are at work. Even though they may vary from case to case, there is a 
recurring pattern: (1) direct effects, typically affecting interrelated players differently; (2) indirect, second-round effects due to their 
competitive interactions; and (3) systemic effects (see Fig. 3). In all scenarios, the total (net) effect of regulatory interventions is 
contingent on the relative magnitude and direction of these three effects. 
5.1. Direct, indirect, and systemic effects of regulation 
These regularities can be illustrated using the four policy issues discussed in section four (see Table 2). An intervention motivated 
by facilitating access to essential resources, such as regulated access to backhaul service, has three consequences. First, it has direct 
effects on the player forced to grant access at regulated conditions (typically the MNO) and on the player, who is seeking access (e.g., a 
provider without backhaul facilities). These direct effects typically affect players in opposite directions. For example, more stringent 
regulation of backhaul services reduces the opportunities of the MNO to appropriate returns from innovation in such services, but it 
reduces the costs and therefore improves the incentives of an access-seeking player to invest and innovate in complementary activities 
Second, the regulatory intervention has indirect effects related to the interdependence of players. Indirect effects are typically 
positive and mutually re-enforcing. This is self-evident if players are in a complementarity relation, for example, it more innovation by 
one player enhances the innovation opportunities of related players. It also holds if players offer substitutes and are in a competitive 
relation, because competition increases the pressure players exert on each other to improve performance. Third, regulatory in-
terventions have systemic effects by influencing the coordination costs between players and as feedbacks from sector outcomes to the 
behavior of players and of regulators. Regulations that reduce coordination costs will typically stimulate innovation because they 
reduce the cost of innovation. Feedback effects from outcomes to player behavior can be positive or negative. 
Similar effects can be identified for other types of regulations. Coverage obligations have direct effects that may improve or impede 
the performance of infrastructure providers. On the other hand, they typically have a positive effect on complementary players, 
because improved coverage increases their innovation opportunities. However, this effect can be reduced of overcompensated if the 
direct effect on infrastructure providers is strongly negative. An intervention such as mandated, regulated MVNX access, typically 
affects MNOs negatively and MVNXs positively. Finally, non-discrimination regulations have similar direct effects on players at 
different layers of the ecosystem. For example, strict net neutrality rules will affect network operators negatively while enhancing the 
opportunities of players at related layers. In all these scenarios, direct, indirect, and systemic effects co-exist. The overall effect of an 
intervention depends on the direction and magnitude of the component effects. 
Fig. 3. An illustration of direct, indirect, and systemic effects of regulation. In a dynamic, interrelated system, a regulatory intervention, such as 
mandated MVNX access, has direct effects (rib, ria, solid lines), indirect effects (thick dotted lines), and higher round, systemic effects (thin dotted 
lines). Plus (+) and minus (− ) signs indicate the direction of the effects. For example, more stringent MVNX regulation (+) will increase incentives 
for MVNXs (+) but decrease incentives for MNOs (− ). The overall effect of regulation on performance will depend on the relative size of these 
component effects and could be positive, negative, or negligible. 
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These direct, indirect, and systemic effects typically work in both directions in the interdependent value system, even though they 
may not be symmetric. For example, other things being equal, deregulation of backhaul will increase the opportunities for rent 
appropriation by MNOs but may reduce the innovation incentives of access seekers. Fewer complementary services will slow inno-
vation in the related layers, and lower coordination costs will increase innovative activities, other things being equal. Matters are 
further complicated by the potential divergence of short-term and long-term effects. For example, in the short run, the availability of a 
regulated, MVNO reference offer may benefit players needing wholesale access, because it reduces the transaction costs of such 
agreements. It may be challenging to define the (virtual) elements and bundles of elements that should be offered on a regulated basis. 
A bigger concern, however, is that such short-term benefits may turn into longer-term liabilities. Reference offers may become focal 
points around which market players organize. This may deter further innovative differentiation and the development of contracts and 
bundles of functions that better support the increasingly heterogeneous needs of MVNOs. 
5.2. Lessons for market design and regulation 
These considerations offer two lessons for 5G market design and regulation. First, they may require a modification of prevailing 
practices. In addition to assessing the rationale for a policy intervention, regulators and policy analysist should routinely gauge the 
potential strengths of direct, indirect, and systemic feedback effects. If the indirect and systemic effects are negligible or small, they can 
likely be ignored:. Existing approaches are capable of yielding valid, abstract models of 5G challenges. Moreover, the prevailing 
practices of regulation can be adapted and are capable of addressing the policy issues. However, if these feedbacks are non-negligible, 
good regulatory design will have to assess them explicitly and incorporate them into market and regulatory design. Few models and 
robust practical tools are currently available to make these assessments with confidence. Many of the challenges could be addressed 
with computational tools, such as dynamic simulations and agent-based modeling. Quantitative and qualitative scenarios, long a tool 
of technology assessment, can be modified to assist in the development of regulatory policy. These approaches are already informing 
policies in some areas, including infrastructure planning (e.g., Oughton & Frias, 2018) and spectrum policy (e.g., Milgrom, 2017). 
Second, 5G policy may benefit from a reconceptualization of how it interacts with the value system of players. It would require 
altering the role of policy and regulation as a set of rules that define constitution—the “order”—of 5G markets. Within these 
boundaries entrepreneurs and market forces can flourish. Given the many complementarities between innovation at the network level 
and players at higher levels, there are strong endogenous mechanisms to align the interests of the players. For example, unless MNOs 
are myopic or overestimate their capabilities to develop vertical market slices themselves, they will negotiate mutually beneficial 
arrangements. Premature, ex-ante regulation of these conditions will unduly reduce the space of potential innovation opportunities 
and the innovation rate. Absent such an experimental approach, many innovations may remain unexplored and unexploited. This is 
not to assert that all will work out just fine in a laissez faire model. Rather, in addition to offering guardrails, policy and regulation may 
need to be invoked if the market does not develop as anticipated. 
This requires an approach in which market design and adaptive, agile regulation complement each other. Market design establishes 
Table 2 
Direct, indirect, and systemic effects of regulatory intervention (simplified).  





Constrains opportunities of infrastructure 
providers to extract profits and hence 
reduces innovation incentives; reduces the 
cost of innovation for local and 
complementary players and hence 
increases their innovation incentives 
Innovation activity by local and 
complementary players provides 
additional incentives for MNOs to invest 
and innovate; reduced investment and 
innovation activity by MNOs may 
constrain local and complementary players 
Successful local and complementary 
innovation may create a virtuous cycle 
with backhaul and other infrastructure 
investment; however, failure to innovate 
may introduce a negative feedback process 
Coverage obligations Shape deployment strategies of MNOs 
typically reducing profit opportunities; 
increase innovation opportunities of 
complementors; (possibly reduce auction 
revenues) 
Coverage goals increase opportunities for 
complementary innovation; rollout 
mandates may create mismatch between 
market needs and network availability 
hence reduce complementary innovation 
Additional complementary innovation 
may create a virtuous cycle with 
infrastructure investment; potential 
mismatch between market needs may 
weaken or erase these synergies 
Regulated MVNX 
access 
Constrain opportunities of players to 
negotiate contracts, reducing the ability of 
MNOs to extract profits and hence reduce 
innovation incentives; reduce the costs of 
innovation for MVNXs and hence increase 
their innovation incentives 
Increased MVNX innovation may provide 
additional incentives for network 
investment and innovation; regulated 
MVNX offers may constrain the negotiation 
of more efficient agreements and stifle 
innovation by MVNXs and infrastructure 
providers 
Reduced transaction costs and 
coordination costs may provide an 
additional stimulus to the players in the 
complementary innovation system; 
regulated access may discourage the entry 
of new intermediaries that could 
coordinate more efficiently 
Non-discrimination 
safeguards 
Strict non-discrimination safeguards will 
reduce innovation incentives of affected 
players; will increase innovation 
opportunities of complementors; weak 
non-discrimination safeguards will put 
fewer constraints on innovation, improve 
QoS for complementors, but possibly 
increase the cost of innovation 
Additional innovation by higher-level 
players may stimulate additional 
infrastructure investment and innovation; 
non-discrimination requirements may 
stifle innovation experiments and slow 
infrastructure investment and innovation 
Additional innovation may lead to overall 
faster rate of innovation and growth of the 
digital ecosystem; strict non- 
discrimination may stifle differentiation 
and the emergence of heterogeneous 
services and solutions 
Source: Author construct. 
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the broad rules for players, which allow differentiation and heterogeneity while providing safeguards against discriminatory strate-
gies. An additional important design feature is to encourage institutional diversity. This can be achieved, for example, by allowing 
different types of players to enter the market and by encouraging local entrepreneurial and policy experiments. For regulation to 
respond to outcomes in an adaptive way, continuous market monitoring is necessary. This requires an appropriate framework for 
collecting and curating data about market developments. Although this requires resources, it is a precondition for securing the efficient 
working of increasingly dynamic and complex, high technology markets. Moreover, regulation must be enabled to respond quickly, if 
needed. The existing framework of regulatory forbearance offers a rudimentary example of ex post regulation and an example of how 
this could be achieved. This approach to 5G markets will create a policy learning environment in which boundary conditions and 
regulation can evolve and improve organically in a framework of overall regulatory stability. 
6. Conclusion 
In the dynamic environment of 5G services, it will be important to consider the direct, indirect, and systemic effects of policy and 
regulation. The overall effects of these often counteracting, positive and negative forces on 5G investment and innovation are difficult 
to assess ex ante. This paper provides a detailed analysis of the potential effects of selected, regulatory interventions that are currently 
in place or considered. In contrast to earlier research, the discussion in this paper relies on an approach inspired by innovation 
economics that considers the strong complementarities between networks, applications, and services explicitly. Innovation is 
conceptualized as an experimental exploration of a space of technological and economic opportunities that is only partially known. 
Players across the entire value system engage in activities to discover and co-create new applications and services. Non-myopic 
network operators and players at higher layers of the value system will recognize these complementarities and embed them in 
their business decisions, but myopic players may manipulate competition in undesirable ways. Regulatory obligations and in-
terventions influence these decisions and hence affect the rate and direction of innovation and investment of individual firms and the 
sector. 
This paper illustrates that traditional, regulatory approaches that focus on the direct effects of regulation on the regulated entities 
may result in a 5G market design that does not support its full innovative potential. Rather, it will be necessary to adopt a broader 
perspective that assesses, in a first step, whether indirect and systemic effects are relevant. If they cannot be ignored, policy will have to 
respond by adopting appropriate analytical tools, such as dynamic models, general rather than partial equilibrium lenses and 
computational methods. Moreover, higher level rules, referred to as the order or constitution of 5G markets, will have to be designed to 
provide guardrails for the players in the 5G market. This would be a more radical departure from current practices but would constitute 
a superior option that is better aligned with the new technological and economic conditions of 5G. These guardrails should allow 
entrepreneurial flexibility while providing safeguards against unwarranted discrimination. The diversity of approaches to 5G regu-
latory market design across Europe and the United States can be seen as a real-world laboratory to explore workable and non-workable 
approaches. As more empirical observations become available, it will be important to assess the outcomes of these experiments and 
learn from successes and failures. 
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